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Abstract—The progress of location-based services has led to severe concerns about location privacy leakage. However, existing
methods are still incompetent for effective and efficient location privacy preservation (LPP). They are often vulnerable under the
identification attack with side information, or hard to be implemented due to the high computational complexity. In this paper, we
pursue the high protection efficacy and low computational complexity simultaneously. We propose a scalable LPP method based on
the paradigm of counterfeiting locations. To make fake locations extremely plausible, we forge them by synthesizing artificial impostors
(AIs). The so-called AIs refer to the synthesized traces that have similar semantic features to the actual traces and do not contain
any target location. We devise two dedicated techniques: the sampling-based synthesis method and population-level semantic model.
They respectively play the significant roles in two critical steps of synthesizing AIs. We conduct the experiments on real datasets in
two cities (Shanghai of China and Asturias of Spain) to validate the high efficacy and scalability of the proposed method. In these two
datasets, the experimental results show that our method achieves the preservation efficacy of 97.68% and 96.24%, and the time spent
for building generators is only 230.47 and 215.92 seconds, respectively. This study would give the research community new insights
into improving the practicality of the state-of-the-art LPP paradigm via counterfeiting locations.
Index Terms—Location Privacy Preservation, Artificial Impostor Trace, Process-Independent, Population-Level Model
F
1 INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of smart mobile terminals, e.g., smart-
phones and vehicle-mounted communication devices, and the
location-based services (LBS) over them, the privacy issues of
locations have attracted much attention [2]. Location privacy
usually refers to the demand to prevent other parties from
learning one’s current or past locations [3]. The obfuscation
mechanism is widely utilized to protect the location privacy,
which transforms an actual location to a set of locations on
the trusted proxy. Then the providers of LBS answer queries
to all locations in this set, and the trusted proxy returns the
useful information to the user.
Some obfuscation methods generate a location set by blend-
ing the actual location with locations of other clients [3]–[5].
However, these methods possibly leak the privacy of other
real clients. Some methods replace user’s location with nearby
points of interest [6], [7]. To some extent, the substitutes might
reveal the region where the user is. Other methods generate
fake locations based on different moving patterns. They mix an
actual location with fake ones in a set [8]–[11]. Unfortunately,
these protection methods are vulnerable to inference attacks
or suffer from substantial time costs. The adversary can easily
identify the fake ones with some side information. Taking this
condition as an instance: The fake location is in a supermarket
at 2:00 am. According to common sense, the supermarket is
closed at this time. This kind of attack uncovers the fake
ones through the semantic relations between the locations and
time or activities. These fake locations are too implausible to
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hide the real one. In other words, the goal of this kind of
obfuscation mechanism is to make the fake ones plausible in
the LBS server side.
In this paper, we aim at designing a scalable and high-
quality location privacy preserving method. The preservation
quality/efficacy of a model is defined as the attacker’s prob-
ability of error to infer the real trace [12]. To achieve the
high efficacy of privacy protection, we generate fake locations
by synthesizing artificial impostors. The so-called impostors
refer to the synthesized traces which have similar semantic
features to the actual traces, and do not contain real locations
of queries. It is worth mentioning that a location refers to a
region in our method for the reason of location cloaking. To
make impostor traces plausible, we utilize visiting patterns of
regions and mobility patterns of users. Visiting pattern refers to
the visitors’ temporal distributions of regions. Mobility pattern
refers to the transition probabilities among regions and the
runtime of passing through regions of users. There are two
steps in our method: The first is to extract regional semantic
features based on the visiting pattern (offline generator). The
second is to generate impostor traces based on the mobility
pattern (online generator). Accordingly, we devise two critical
techniques in two steps to achieve a high efficacy with a low
computational complexity:
(1) A Sampling-Based Synthesis Method. Users’ trajectories
are composed of their visited locations. A straightforward
method for synthesizing an impostor trace is to forge fake
locations corresponding to all the visited locations. However,
this complicated method cannot improve the preservation
efficacy considerably. The requirement of too many simul-
taneously plausible fake locations possibly limits the number
of candidate plausible traces, then let down the preservation
efficacy. When generating a plausible but fake trace for a user,
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2it is convincingly unnecessary to utilize all the locations in
his/her trajectory. Our solution is to sample visited locations
directly. The challenge here is how to keep the plausibility
of artificial impostor traces based on the sampled locations.
To this end, we only choose some special pause points (not
the locations just passed through) as milestones along the
trip. We call them stations. They are semantic regions where
people want to go instead of simple sampling locations in the
trace. For example, Alice drives home after work and wants
to buy a hamburger in a drive-through restaurant. There are
three stations along her trace: Her company, the restaurant,
and her home. Except for these three stations, the locations
she passed by are relatively meaningless in the privacy sense.
This kind of sampling method is process-independent, which
means we utilize stations to synthesize fake traces, but not all
the locations in the trace. Based on stations, we synthesize an
impostor trace by the following procedures: Replacing stations
with fake ones (semantically similar locations), and then com-
plementing plausible paths among stations by finding the kth
most possible traces according to the transition probabilities
among regions.
(2) A Population-Level Semantic Model. Station refers to
the record with the location and time. To make the generated
fake station resemble the real one, we let the fake and
real stations have similar semantic regional features. In the
process of extracting the regional semantic features, a critical
step is the location clustering. Each cluster of locations has
a semantic feature. To dig the semantic similarity among
locations concerning visited patterns, a useful approach is to
analyze the transfer probability among visited locations along
traces of different users. Unsurprisingly, such an individual-
level approach is so careful that it can complete semantic
clustering with impressively high efficacy. However, a substan-
tial computational cost of this extremely carefulness is indeed
daunting, though the achieved high efficacy is indeed enviable.
In this work, under the precondition of high efficacy, we strive
for a low computational cost by devising a population-level
model to extract features and cluster locations. We divide the
city map into different regions, and break up all trajectories
into independent locations. After that, we extract stations of
users’ traces and model the geographical distribution of these
stations in different regions. The feasibility of our population-
level model depends on the fact that the essential semantic
feature of a region can be judged from the mobility of crowds.
Consider a simple situation where most people leave home to
work in the morning, and come back home at night. It is
evident that the out-stream is abundant in the morning and
the in-stream is abundant in the night of uptown, whereas the
opposite is the statistical stream of people in a workplace.
Hence, based on this geographical distribution model, we
can compute the semantic similarity of different regions, and
then aggregate all regions into clusters with different latent
semantic features.
With the cooperation of these two techniques, our method
successfully achieves high computational efficiency with con-
spicuous preservation efficacy. Intuitively, the sampling-based
synthesis model can to some extent subserve the improvement
of preservation efficacy despite the reduction due to the coarse
clustering by the population-level model.
In the experiment, we compare our method with four
representative ones on the different scales of maps in two cities
(Shanghai of China and Asturias of Spain). We validate the
performance by the state-of-the-art location inference attack
[12]. The primary experimental results in these two datasets
(Shanghai’s and Asturias’s, respectively) can be summarized
as follows:
• In the small-scale map (12km × 9km), the preservation
efficacy of our method is slightly lower than SG-Lppm [8],
the state-of-the-art method of location privacy preservation,
but is significantly higher than other three methods. Moreover,
our method has a significant advantage in the time consumed
by generating a fake trace online over SG-Lppm. Specifically,
our method achieves the efficacy of 97.95% and 95.91%, com-
pared with 98.33% and 97.59% by SG-Lppm in two datasets,
respectively. While other methods achieve the efficacy which
is less than 80%. To generate one fake trace online, it takes
our method only 19.76ms and 17.89ms, compared with 72.31s
and 74.03s by SG-Lppm in two datasets, respectively.
• In the large-scale map (42km × 35km) of two cities, we
build the impostor generator offline in just 230.47 and 215.92
seconds in two datasets, and we can achieve the efficacy of
97.68% and 96.24%, respectively. However, SG-Lppm has
been executed for two weeks without any output, due to its
high time complexity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
2, we provide the related work. We give an overview of
our proposed scheme in Section 3, and describe two main
steps of the scheme in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
We provide the validation of preservation efficacy and the
evaluation of scalability of our methods in Section 6. Finally,
we draw a conclusion in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
There has already existed plenty of remarkable studies on
location privacy preservation [8], [13]–[17]. According to the
application scenarios, the privacy preservation methods can be
widely classified into three types [20].
The first type of techniques is proposed to protect the
privacy of location during transmission. Khoshgozaran et al.
[6] defined a Hilbert ordering with a key, and use it to encrypt
the database and the queries. Ashouri et al. [1] proposed the
GLP protocol to address the location privacy problem for a
group of users. These methods are based on cryptographic
methods. The adversary can not decode information which is
transmitted between users and LBS providers.
The second type of techniques is devised to protect the
privacy of the statistic database of location data. The state-
of-the-art technique is differential privacy [20]–[22]. Its goal
is to protect an individual’s data while publishing aggregate
information about the database. Andres et al. [20] proposed
to achieve Geo-Indistinguishability by adding noise drawn
from a Laplace distribution. Zhang et al. [22] proposed a
new probabilistic differential Privacy-preserving location rec-
ommendation framework. They used it to achieve the trade-
off between high recommendation accuracy and strict location
privacy for check-in dataset.
3The third type of techniques is utilized to protect the privacy
of individual-specific location data. This kind of techniques
is based on obfuscation methods. They transform an actual
location to a set of locations, which keeps the utility of
services and privacy of location. This is the focus of this work.
According to the different ways of generating location sets, we
classify these methods into 3 categories as follows:
(1) Anonymizing the actual location in a set of locations of
other users. This anonymization mechanism is a function to
hide the user in the class with k users in [3]–[5], [23]–[26].
Hara et al. [25], selected the fake traces among others with
some strict constraints for a targeted real trace. Although this
protection performs well, other’s privacy was leaked during
this process. Yao et al. [5] divided the area into clusters
(namely CK) where each cluster includes k users. When a
client proposes a query to the LBS provider, the boundary
of the area he belongs to is sent to the servers. However,
this method limits an adversary’s probability to infer the
accurate location to 1/k. If there are no k − 1 clients near
the user, the CK will be too large to provide satisfactory
service. Moreover, this exposes the general location of them.
Lee et al. [4] extracted the semantic features of regions by
the distribution of nearby users’ staying duration of locations.
By the semantic features, they computed the cloaking area.
However, the approach is invalid when there are not enough
other users around.
(2) Replacing the actual location with a set of other places.
This mechanism is a kind of methods to replace the real loca-
tion with the place near-by (e.g., spatial cloaking) [6], [7], [14],
[27]. Dewri et al. [28] utilized the principle of m-invariance to
generate spatial cloaking regions to protect location privacy.
To generate the cloaking regions, they adopted and modified
HilbertCloak algorithm introduced in [16]. Yiu et al. [7]
transformed the user’s location to intersection or building
nearby. However, the distance between the real location and
target has an impact on the utility and privacy. If there is no
target near the user, the response from LBS provider cannot
match the real query accurately, and if the target is close
enough to the user, it may expose his/her location. The spatial
transformation method [6] uses Hilbert curves to transform
users’ locations and sends the transformed location to the LBS
server. The disadvantage of this method is that it requires LBS
providers to transform all locations data (such as locations of
shops). The maintaining cost of services is noticeable.
(3) Generating a set with the real location and generated
dummy locations in [29], [30]. Generating dummy locations
aims to hide the real location among a set of fake locations.
The LBS provider makes the response to all the queries, and
TTP filters the information of the user’s requirement. So, this
kind of methods can keep the service utility. To improve the
effectiveness, dummy locations can be generated based on
synthesizing traces. You et al. [11] generated dummy locations
based on a random walk. Chow [10] built the path between
two random locations on the map. Xu et al. [31] generated
the fake paths based on a simple greedy algorithm and spatial
generalization strategy. To make fake locations more plausible,
locations can be classified by semantic features. The method in
[4] generates semantic features by the time durations of places,
Client LBS Provider
Trusted  proxy
Response to the
real query
The blend of 
real query, 
fake queries
Real query
Make response 
to all queries
Fig. 1: When a user proposes a query about the record in the
ith time interval to the LBS provider (e.g., the nearby restau-
rants of the current location), his/her device first publishes this
query to a third trusted proxy. The proxy synthesizes impostor
traces through the generator, and generates fake records by
extracting ones at the ith time interval of impostor traces. The
TTP transfers the set of blended data to the LBS server. Due to
the indistinguishability, the server responds to all the queries in
the set. The proxy filters the target response from all returned
values, and send it back to the user. At last, the generated fake
records are stored in the TTP.
[32] by combining human mobility with POIs, and [33] by
computing the frequency of visiting locations. On this basis,
Shorkri et al. [8] extracted the mobility patterns as common
semantic features through matching the locations of every two
users in the real mobility datasets, and replaced all locations
of a user’s real trace with ones in the same semantic cluster
to generate fake traces. This method takes the correlation of
sequential locations into account, so that extend generating
fake locations to fake traces. This approach achieves a high
efficacy in their paper. However, while enjoying such efficacy,
it has to suffer from a considerable time cost to generate se-
mantic clusters of regions, and more simultaneously plausible
fake locations limit the number of candidate plausible traces,
then possibly let down the applicability.
We limit the scope of our study into the third type of
techniques mentioned above, i.e., the preservation methods
that are utilized to protect the privacy of individual-specific
location data. This is one of the reasons why there are no
comparisons with the methods in different scenarios in our
experiments, such as the differential privacy preservation,
despite of their well-recognized high performance in specific
application scenarios.
3 OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present an overview of our scheme to
generate dummy traces. Our approach is deployed in the third
trusted proxy (TTP), which is well accepted in the research
community. The TTP is an architecture with distributed sys-
tems so that large-scale data can be stored in it. We describe
the framework and procedures of our method by using the
illustration in Fig. 1 and its elaborated caption. The fake
records generated before and real trace are stored in the TTP,
as done in [18], [28]. The detailed reason for storing generated
fake records will be provided in Section 5.1.
We discretize time and space by dividing a day into time
intervals and dividing the map into fixed-sized grids, obtaining
benefits in two aspects:
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Stations-Sections Extraction1
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Mobility Rule Generation3
Regional Feature Generation2
Fig. 2: Our scheme includes two modules: offline generator module of synthetic rules (corresponds to the Steps 1-3) and online
generator module of impostor traces (corresponds to the Step 4).
(1) Keeping the stability of location privacy and utility of
service when using LBS.
(2) Partitioning the continuous geographical and temporal
data into discrete ones, so that facilitating the mathematical
deduction in the following analysis.
As depicted in Fig. 2, there are 4 steps in our scheme.
We first extract the semantic feature of each gird based on
the dataset of seed traces. Each seed consists of stations and
sections. We can extract them in the preprocessing phase
corresponding to Step 1. Then by analyzing the temporal
distribution of stations of each grid, we compute the similarity
between every two grids. We can extract semantic features
of these grids by clustering them in Step 2. In Step 3, we
establish the mobility model for users which includes the
transition probabilities among grids and the runtime of passing
through grids. These processes are based on the mobility of
the crowd. Note that the mobility pattern is indeed population-
level. Naturally, the seed traces’ privacy can be protected
during the processes. Building the online generator module
for impostor traces depends on the realization of the former
module. Its procedure refers to Steps 4 in Fig. 2. In this
step, for a real trace, we extract its stations and replace them
with records that have similar regional features. Then we fill
in sections among these stations to generate impostor traces.
The attack model in this paper uses a set of training traces
to create a mobility profile for each user in the form of a
Markov Chain transition probability matrix via the knowledge
construction mechanism [8]. Having the user mobility profiles
and the observed traces, the adversary tries to infer the actual
trace. The estimation is just based on a Bayesian location
inference approach [12].
After giving the overview of our scheme, we elaborate
two pivotal parts of the scheme in Section 4 and Section 5,
respectively. Table 1 presents the list of notations adopted in
this paper.
4 OFFLINE GENERATOR FOR SYNTHETIC
RULES
In this section, we propose the rules of synthesizing impostor
traces. The processes of generating rules are offline. We build
TABLE 1: Table of Notations
Notation Definition
r a region (location)
t a time interval
R the set of regions
NS the number of time intervals when generating seman-
tic features
NM the number of time intervals when building mobility
model
NU the number of time intervals when sampling loca-
tions of user’s trace
Nr(t) the number of people flow into or flow out of r at t
Pr the distribution of people flow into or out of r
CS the semantic class where station S in
GS the semantic similarity graph of regions
GP the transition probability graph of regions
T (t) the tensor of the runtime of traveling across regions
at t
ETk the estimated time of reaching region k
ds(u, v) the semantic distance between regions u and v
dg(u, v) the geographical distance between regions u and v
this generator by the seed traces. As illustrated in Fig. 2,
we divide the module into three parts: extracting stations and
sections (Step 1), generating semantic features of regions (Step
2), and modeling mobility pattern of users (Step 3).
4.1 Extract Stations and Sections
We design this module under the framework of spatial-
temporal cloaking. So, we divide the map into fixed-sized
grids. When users’ devices upload their trajectories to the
trusted proxy, the data are composed of a series of records
of GPS coordinates and the corresponding time. We first stan-
dardize the records by matching GPS coordinates to grids, and
matching accurate time to time intervals. For each trajectory,
it is a sequence of region-time pairs, denoted by 〈r, t〉.
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Fig. 3: Alice drives back home (location B) from the company
(location A) in the evening, and she stops twice: The first
one is the crossroads where she waits for the traffic light; the
second one is the drive-in restaurant where she gets a burger.
The company, drive-in restaurant, and home are stations, and
the sections are the traces among them. Taxi driver Bob picks
up passengers at location C, and drops them at location D.
Here, C and D are stations for him. The corresponding section
is the section from C to D.
The station is not just the simple pause location during the
trip, but the phased destination of a user. There are lots of
stopping periods of time for vehicles. These stopping periods
can be further divided into two classes:
• Periods of pausing and waiting for moving ahead, e.g.,
waiting for the traffic light.
• Periods of parking periods, e.g., parking the car and
having lunch.
We define the station as the record 〈r, t〉 where and when a
vehicle starts or ends the second kind of stopping periods.
Specifically, for a private car driver, the second kind of
stopping period is the duration of parking time which exceeds
a threshold, and the records of the start and the end of this
time duration are consequently the so-called stations.
We define the section as the targeted trace from a station
to the next station. Naturally, a station is the end of the
last section, and also the start of the next section. The trace
consists of several continuous sections. Intuitively, stations are
the milestones of a trace. We provide two examples in Fig. 3.
4.2 Generating Semantic Features of Regions
Our goal here is to generate the semantic features of regions by
their visiting patterns. This process consists of two steps: The
first is to compute the semantic similarities between every two
regions; the second is to cluster regions based on similarities.
To this end, we model the distributions of human flow for each
region.
In the trajectory of a user, only the stations, serving as the
phased destinations, make semantic sense, since the sections
between them are usually selected based on some routing opti-
mization schemes, such as choosing paths with the minimum
costs [34]. For example, a man is on a business trip in an
unfamiliar city. He intends to go to the company from the
hotel. A rational decision for him is usually to choose the
path with the limited time. During the travel process, he does
not care about the locations he just passed by. The hotel and
company are the only two locations with semantic features for
him. So, we generate the semantic features only by stations.
Intuitively, if there is a start or end station of a person’s trace
in a region, this region has a semantic meaning to him; while,
if he just passes through the region, it means nothing to him. In
fact, if we take all the records in the whole trace into account,
the non-station records will possibly cause inaccuracy. In our
method, we focus on these stations and neglect the processes
between them (process-independent). For each region grid, we
do not care about the movement of people inside and the
movement of people just passing through it; we only focus
on the temporal distribution of stations in this region.
In Step 2, as illustrated in Fig. 2, we propose a semantic
metric to compare the similarities among stations based on the
temporal distributions of the crowd. In this step, we assign a
high similarity value to a pair of regions if the distributions
of flow-ins and flow-outs of them are really similar, regardless
of their geographical distance. For example, the flow-ins of
region RA and RB are mostly distributed in the morning, and
the majority of flow-outs of them are distributed in the evening.
Their distributions of human flow are similar. Although RA 6=
RB , we regard RA and RB as semantically similar regions.
In this example, RA and RB might be workplaces.
The metric of semantic similarity between different regions
is to compare the changes of human flow over time. Thus,
we divide a day into time intervals and denote the number of
intervals by NS . In the previous process, we extract stations
from seed traces. Let Nin(r, t) and Nout(r, t) denote the
numbers of human flow-in and flow-out of region r in time
interval t, respectively. For the different sources of generating
human flow, there are two types of methods to calculate
Nin(r, t) and Nout(r, t):
(1) The human flow is based on the statistics of the mobility
data of mobile devices’ owners (e.g., private car driver). For
example, a man goes to a bar in the evening, which increases
Nin of this region. In this case, we compute the human flow as
follows: During the period from the time when a client reaches
region r to the time he leaves r, if station 〈r, t〉 in his/her trace
is the first station in r, we assume that a person enters and
visits this region, so Nin(r, t) adds 1. Analogously, if station
〈r, t′〉 in his/her trace is the last station during this period,
he leaves this region, and Nout(r, t′) adds 1. For example,
a driver drives into region r from region x at time t1, and
parks his/her car to work in his/her company at time t3 (station
〈r, t3〉). At the time t5, he leaves his/her company drives home
(station 〈r, t5〉), and he reaches the next region y at time t7.
So, Nin(r, t3) adds 1, and Nout(r, t5) adds 1. The sketch is
depicted in Fig. 4.
(2) The human flow is irrelevant to the statistics of the
mobility data of mobile devices’ owners (e.g., taxi driver).
For example, a taxi driver takes a passenger to a hospital. This
driver does not contribute to the human flow of this region,
but the passenger does. In this case, there must be a signal
that represents the mobility of passengers. For a record 〈r, t〉,
if the signal indicates that a passenger gets off in region r at
6...
<r, ti > Station Record<r, ti >
 Period Time
...<x, t0 > <r, t1 > <r, t3 ><r, t2 > <r, t4 > <r, t5 > <r, t6 > <y, t7 >
Fig. 4: An example of computing human flow.
time t, then Nin(r, t) adds 1. On the contrary, if a passenger
gets on, then Nout(r, t) adds 1.
For each region on the map, after computing the human flow
(flow-in and flow-out), we can straightforwardly normalize
them by the following equations:
Pin(r, t) =
Nin(r, t)∑
i≤NS Nin(r, i)
,
Pout(r, t) =
Nout(r, t)∑
i≤NS Nout(r, i)
.
(1)
We define the semantic similarity based on the Kullback-
Leibler Divergence (KLD). It is a metric of how one probabil-
ity distribution diverges from the other probability distribution.
We use KL(P‖Q) to represent the KLD between distributions
P and Q, and SKL(P‖Q) to represent the symmetry KLD:
KL(P‖Q) =
∑
i≤NS
P (i) · log
(
P (i)
Q(i)
)
, (2)
SKL(P‖Q) = KL(P‖Q) +KL(Q‖P )
2
. (3)
There are two distributions for every region: distributions
of flow-ins and distributions of flow-outs. For regions A and
B, we let PinA (PoutA ) and PinB (PoutB) denote the
distributions of flow-in (flow-out) of them, respectively. The
semantic distance between A and B is:
ds(A,B)=
α · SKL(PinA‖PinB) + β · SKL(PoutA‖PoutB).
We can compute the semantic similarity between A and B by:
Sim(A,B) = 1− ds(A,B)
z
,
where α and β (with α + β = 1) represent the importance
indexes of flow-in and flow-out, respectively, and z denotes a
normalization constant:
z = max
X,Y ∈R
(ds(X,Y )).
By computing the similarities between every two regions,
we can build a graph GS . Its vertexes are regions, and the
weight of an edge represents the semantic similarity between
two vertexes. We implement the hierarchical clustering algo-
rithm on GS to group regions into distinguishing classes. The
regions fall into the same class are similar in the distributions
of human flow, despite their geographical distance from each
other. In other words, the probabilities that people go into
and leave them are close in a specific time interval, so they
represent the semantic features of regions. For example, if
there are two residential areas, people are more likely to leave
Algorithm 1 Extracting Semantic Features of Regions
Input: Stations of seed traces
Output: Clusters of regions
1: Initiate a weighted graph GS with regions R as vertices
2: for each region r ∈ R do
3: Compute distribution Pinr and Poutr
4: end
5: for each region r1 ∈ R do
6: for each region r2 ∈ R do
7: Compute the semantic distance between r1 and r2,
i.e., ds(r1, r2), by:
α · SKL(Pinr1‖Pinr2) + β · SKL(Poutr1‖Poutr2)
8: Compute the edge weight between r1 and r2 by:
w(r1, r2) = 1− ds(r1, r2)
z
9: end
10: end
11: Return: Cluster regions by implementing Hierarchical
Clustering algorithm on GS
these areas in the morning and go into them in the evening.
Thus we consider these regions are semantically equivalent.
The process of generating regional semantic features is
depicted in Algorithm 1.
4.3 Modeling Mobility Pattern
We build the model of users’ mobility pattern in this sub-
section. It is a location-dependent first-order Markov chain
[35] on the set of regions. For mobility patterns of individuals
usually vary with time, we partition a day into several time
intervals. Denote the number of time intervals as NM . The
mobility profile is 〈GP (t), T (t)〉 of a given time t, which will
be elaborated later.
In a time interval t, GP (t) is a weighted directed graph
which depicts the transition probability between two regions.
It is established based on the Markov chain, which means the
position of a user is just related to the last position in his/her
trace. The vertexes of GP (t) are the regions on the map, and
the weight of edge from r to r′ is − logP (r′|r), where P (r′|r)
is the probability that users move to region r′ from region r in
the time interval t. If r′ is not adjacent to r, P (r′|r) equals 0.
The reason for setting − logP (r′|r) as the weight is that the
process, finding the trace with the kth maximum probability,
can be transformed into the process of finding the kth shortest
path in GP (t).
For a given time t, T (t) is a three-dimensional tensor which
represents the runtime of passing through regions. The entry
T (rB , rA, rC) is the runtime of traveling across region rB
from rA to rC in this time interval. For example, region rA
and rC are adjacent to rB . In time t, a user leaves region rA
at time tA, and enter rB . Then he reaches region rC at time
tC . We record the entry as:
T (rB , rA, rC) = tC − tA. (4)
7Algorithm 2 Modeling Users’ Mobility in Different Intervals
Input: Sections between stations of seed traces
Output: Mobility 〈GP (t), T (t)〉 for each time interval t
1: for each time interval t ≤ NM do
2: Initiate a weighted directed graph GP (t) with regions
R as vertices
3: for each region r1 ∈ R do
4: for each region r2 ∈ R do
5: Compute the edge weight by:
w(r1, r2) = − logP (r1|r2)
6: end
7: end
8: Initial a three-dimensional tensor T (t)
9: for each region r1 ∈ R do
10: for each region r2 ∈ R do
11: for each region r1 ∈ R do
12: T (r1, r2, r3) ← the average time of passing
through r1 from r2 to r3
13: end
14: end
15: end
16: end
However, if region rX is not adjacent to region rB , it holds
that ∑
r∈R T (rB , rX , r) = 0,
where R is the set of all regions.
When users are traveling between two stations, they usually
choose the way with the minimum cost (time or fuel consump-
tion). Between the same starting and destination locations,
in the same interval, users usually choose the similar path,
and the traveling time is similar too. We model the mobility
pattern in a population-level way, where GP (t) and T (t) are
averaged by taking all users into account. The advantages can
be summarized as follows:
(1) The impostor trace performs like ordinary user’s trace,
and it does not reveal the character of any individual client.
(2) It can protect the individual private trajectories in data
processing.
The detailed process is referred to in Algorithm 2.
5 ONLINE GENERATOR FOR IMPOSTORS
In this section, we present the details of our method for
synthesizing impostor traces based on the actual location and
offline module. It is depicted in Algorithm 3. When a user
proposes a query about a record 〈r, t〉 to the LBS server,
his/her record is updated to the online generator in TTP. In
this scenario, the generator extracts a part of the real trace of
this user containing the target record and synthesizes impostor
traces according to it. The query is about a record but not
a trace. After generating a collection of impostor traces, we
obtain the fake records as follows:
We first determine the time interval t of the actual record
(reported to LBS). Then we select the records in the time
interval t of impostor traces as the fake ones.
Algorithm 3 Synthesizing Plausible Traces
Input: (1) A real record; (2) Trajectory around the real record;
(3) Fake records generated before; (4) The number of
impostor traces (n).
Output: Impostor traces
1: Locate real start station Start, and real end station End
2: for station si ∈ {station | stations in the real trace from
Start to End} do
3: if si has fake records generated before then
4: The set of candidate fake records ← {fake records
generated before}
5: else
6: The location l of si ∈ semantic class Cl
7: The set of candidate fake records ← {records 〈r, t〉
| r ∈ Cl − l, t = time of si}
8: end
9: end
10: for every two successive stations S, E ∈ {station | stations
in the real trace from Start to End} do
11: for each candidate fake location S′ of S do
12: for each candidate fake location E′ of E do
13: dg(S
′, E′) ← the geographical distance between
central points of S′ and E′
14: Add an edge between S′ and E′ with weight w,
w ← −|dg(S,E)− dg(S′, E′)|
15: end
16: end
17: Match candidate fake records of S and E in the bipartite
graph by Kuhn-Munkres algorithm
18: Choose n pairs of fake records whose geographical
distances are the top n similar to dg(S,E)
19: for every pair fake records fS of S (〈sS , tS〉) and fE
of E (〈sE , tE〉) do
20: Time interval t ← tS+tE2
21: Impostor trace ← kth shortest path from fS to fE in
the graph GP (t)
22: for the ith record in the impostor trace do
23: Compute estimate time ETi of reaching region i
24: Compute the cloaking time of ETi
25: end
26: end
27: end
We synthesize impostor traces by utilizing the stations
instead of all of the records in the complete trace. The reasons
are as follows:
(1) Stations represent the semantic features of activities.
(2) We utilize stations but not all of the records. It means
less restriction of the input data.
(3) We are able to synthesize reasonable traces with low
complexity.
For users’ traces, we divide a day into NU intervals. It
indicates that the locations in the trace are sampled every
24/NU hours.
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Fig. 5: The cumulative distribution function of the number of
stations with time.
5.1 Transforming Stations into Fake Ones
In this subsection, we generate fake stations based on the
target records and side information. As presented in Section
3, the real trace and the fake records generated before are
stored in the TTP. A user proposes a query about the record
in the ith time interval to the TTP. The TTP first extracts two
parts of information from stored data: The first part is the
user’s trajectory during the period from 15 hours before the
time of the target record to 15 hours after it. We will explain
why we choose 15 hours as the period in the next paragraph.
The second part contains the fake records generated before.
We divide stations into two categories, the special ones and
ordinary ones. For a station, if we have generated fake records
for it in the previous procedures of synthesizing impostors, we
regard it as a special station. Otherwise, if it does not have
corresponding fake ones, it is an ordinary station.
The process of transforming stations into fake ones begins
with extracting a part of the real trace. This part of the trace is
user’s real trajectory from the start station to end station. It acts
as the template of impostor traces which will be synthesized in
our framework. There are two rules for selecting the start and
end stations under different conditions: (1) In the trajectory
from the stored data, if there are special stations before (after)
the target record, we select the special one which is nearest
to the target record in the time dimension as the start (end)
station. (2) If there is no special station before (after) the target
record, we select the ordinary one which is nearest to the
target record in the time dimension as the start (end) station.
It is worth mentioning that if there is no station after the
target record, we regard the target one as a station. So, we
should find stations in the period around the time of the target
record as much as possible. We randomly choose traces of
2000 vehicles in 30 days from the dataset of Shanghai, and
traces of 50 vehicles in 100 days from the dataset of Asturias.
Then, we count the time intervals between every two adjacent
stations. The cumulative distributions functions of the number
of stations are elaborated in Fig. 5. It is evident that the period
of 15 hours can cover most adjacent stations. This is the reason
why we choose 15 hours as the time period.
After receiving the target record, the TTP first identifies
stations in the trajectory (from stored data) according to the
definition of stations in Section 4.1. Then the TTP selects the
start and end stations to extract the part of the real trace. As
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(a) 4 combinations of start and end stations: (1) Special start station, and
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Ordinary start station, but special end station. (4) Ordinary start station, and
ordinary end station.
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Fake Ends
(b) An example of transforming stations into fake ones
Fig. 6: The sketch of transforming stations into fake ones.
depicted in Fig. 6(a), due to the different states of stations, we
have 4 combinations of the start and end stations.
For a special station, in this process, the fake candidate
records are the same with ones generated before. For an
ordinary station, to keep the semantic similarity between the
fake and actual stations, the fake station should be extracted
from the same semantic class as the actual one. For any
station S in a trace, its location X corresponds to the regional
semantic class CX . In order to prevent the leakage of the
original information, we remove X from CX before picking
the fake station. So, we choose the fake location X ′ ∈ CX−X .
In this case, the fake candidate stations are the records
{〈r, t〉|r ∈ CX −X, t = time of S} .
It is noted that there may be some other stations in the
trace from the start to end. We synthesize fake the sub-traces
between every two continuous stations. For any station in this
trace, it has the corresponding fake candidates, and its fake
stations are selected from them. The selection of fake stations
is not randomized. It utilizes the rule that the distance between
two continuous candidate fake stations should correspond to
the travel time of real trace. Otherwise, the fake stations
can be identified easily by attackers. For example, if two
fake stations are 50km apart, but the runtime between their
corresponding real stations is just 10 minutes, it is manifestly
unrealistic. Intuitively, we intend to ensure that fake stations
are semantically and geographically similar to the actual pairs.
To keep the utility of service, we partition the map into
small grids, e.g., of area 1km × 1km. We define the distance
between regions as the distance (in a straight line) between
two central points of them. For every two continuous stations
in the real trace, the first one is the start station S, and the
second is the end station E. We compute the distance between
every two regions from two sets. One is the locations set FS
9of fake candidates of S, and the other is the locations set
FE of fake candidates of E. We can build a bipartite graph
whose vertices are divided into two disjoint and independent
sets FS and FE , respectively. The weight of the edge connects
S′ ∈ FS and E′ ∈ FE is calculated by:
w = −|dg(S,E)− dg(S′, E′)|,
where dg represents the geographical distance. After building
the graph, we utilize the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm to match the
region from FS to the one from FE , and keep the maximum
sum of weights [36]. To generate n impostor traces, we choose
n pairs of regions, whose geographical distances are the top n
similar to the real. Remark that the impostor trace should have
the same number of stations with the real trace. For example,
if n = 3, the sketch of transforming stations into fake ones is
shown in Fig. 6(b). After generating fake records for an end
station, its candidate set turns to be fake records generated just
now, and it will be applied to generate fake records for the next
station. This approach can keep the geographical similarity
between imposters and real traces.
5.2 Complementing Impostor Trace
A trace can be represented by a sequence of records. In
this subsection, we fill in the trace among fake stations. For
a section from the start station to end station, any random
walk appears to be logical. However, if a vehicle is in the
wrong direction of a road, it can easily be debunked. We
fill in the section based on the mobility model GP (t) in a
specific time interval t (t ≤ NM ). For a pair of the start
location S and end location E, our goal is to find out the
trace (S, r1, r2, r3, ..., rn, E) with the largest probability. The
process of this step can be formulated by:
arg max
trace
P (trace|S,E) = arg max
trace
(P (S) · P (r1|S)
×
n−1∏
i=1
P (ri+1|ri) · P (E|rn))
For the value of P (S) is a constant for a specific start location,
the formula above can be shortened as:
arg max
trace
(P (r1|S) ·
n−1∏
i=1
P (ri+1|ri) · P (E|rn)) (5)
However, consider a situation, there is a strong attacker who
can construct the knowledge of user’s mobility in advance. If
the impostor traces generated by our model are always based
on the maximum transition probability, the attacker can filter
out the impostor traces easily, because the probability of real
traces is not always the maximum value. Hence, we choose the
trace with the kth greatest probability as the fake. To increase
the robustness of our algorithm, we add some randomness
to the selection of the value of k. The probability of k is
dependent on the statistic of the real data.
In our weighted directed graph of regions, given the start
and end regions, we can select the trace with the kth greatest
probability by computing the kth shortest trace between two
regions in the graph GP . We find the kth shortest path based
on the Dijkstra’s algorithm and A∗ algorithm [37]. The weight
tS ET1 ET2 ET3 ETn tE
γ ·∑r∈R T (S ′, r, r1) γ · T (rn, rn−1, E ′)
r1 r2 r3 rn· · · E ′S ′
Fig. 5. Optimal delay depending on the freedom degree γ. The solid curve (including the “singletons”, i.e., isolated
nodes) denotes the function of optimal delay in terms of γ; the dashed curves denote the upper and lower bounds of
this function.
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Fig. 7: An illustration of adding timestamp.
of the edge is − log(P (r′|r)), so that the distance in the graph
of a trace (S, r1, r2, r3, ..., rn, E) is
− log
(
P
(
r1
S
) ·∏n−1i=1 P ( ri+1ri ) · P ( Ern)) .
The kth shortest trace is the trace with the kth greatest
probability.
5.3 Add Timestamp
After generating the impostor trace (S′, r1, r2, r3, ..., rn, E′),
we add timestamps to each region in the trace. As illustrated
in Fig. 7, the start time is tS and end time is tE according to
the real trace. We assign the time interval t as the interval
including the time (tS + tE)/2. The runtime of traveling
through very egion along the impostor trace is the statistical
time multiplied by γ. We compute γ and the estimated time
ETk to arrive at region k by the following procedures:
Φ =
∑
ri∈r
T (S′, ri, r1) +
n−2∑
i=1
T (ri+1, ri, ri+2)
+T (rn, rn−1, E′),
Ψ =
∑
ri∈r
T (S′, ri, r1) +
k−1∑
i=1
T (ri+1, ri, ri+2),
γ =
tE − tS
Φ
,
ETk = tS + γ ·Ψ.
The time we estimate is accurate to second order. Therefore,
we need to transform it into the interval as LBS providers’
requirement. We can compute the cloaking time interval of
region k in the impostor trace as
⌈
ETk
NU
⌉
.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Experiment Setup
In this section, we implement our method on the real traces
of two datasets. One is the dataset of taxis’ traces in Shanghai
of China [38], and the other is the dataset of private cars’
traces in Asturias, Spain [39]. The vehicular trajectories data
in Shanghai were collected from 13693 taxis from April 1st,
2015 to April 30th, 2015. They were recorded every few
seconds in 30 days. The raw dataset of Shanghai is a series
of records, which contains the latitude, longitude, time and
the signal of whether carrying passengers. The original data in
Asturias is the GPS traces for one year collected from 142 cars,
and records are reported with an interval of 30 seconds. The
Asturias’ dataset is a series of records containing the latitude,
longitude, and time. The experiments are implemented based
on the different scales of maps in Shanghai and Asturias,
respectively.
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Fig. 8: The relationships between the efficacy and the length
of the side of one square grid.
We first preprocess the datasets: Dividing the map into
regular size grids, and dividing a day into several time intervals
(NM ). To obtain the most proper size of the grid, we record
the relations between the different sizes of the grid and the
efficacy while synthesizing 10 impostors for each trace. The
result is depicted in Fig. 8. In these two datasets, when we
divide the map into regular 1km× 1km grids, we can achieve
the best efficacy. We make an explanation as follows: If we
choose a small size to generate a grid, it might contain not
enough stations for extracting the regional similarity. If we
choose a large size, the number of grids in the same cluster
is possibly limited.
To choose the appropriate NM , we make statistics of the
time consumptions when passing through a grid, and the
transition probabilities between grids in the different time for
two datasets. In every hour, we randomly choose 100 grids and
calculate the average time consumption when passing through
them. We also randomly choose 100 pairs of grids to calculate
the average transition probability between them. As depicted
in Fig. 9, the result shows that the transition probability of
one dataset fluctuates around a constant value. However, the
time consumption of traveling through a grid varies from hour
to hour. To keep the accuracy, we build the mobility model
every hour in a day. This means that NM = 24.
For the dataset of taxis’ traces in Shanghai, if a taxi stops for
a while and picks up passengers (lets passengers off), stations
are the start and the end records of these time periods. It
is noteworthy that if the time and regions of them are the
same, they will be regarded as the same station. The dataset
in Shanghai has the signal of whether carrying passengers.
If the signal of a record changes from 0 to 1, it represents a
passenger getting on at this time. So there is a passenger leaves
this location. On the contrary, when a passenger is getting
off, he goes into this location. In the experiment, we extract
11569124 stations from the dataset.
For the dataset of private cars in Asturias, we assume that
the start and end of a period are stations, if the period of
a vehicle parking in a grid is longer than a threshold. The
dataset in Asturias are recorded every 30 seconds (accurate
time, longitude and latitude), and we can judge whether a
car stops from it. The time of a car waiting for the traffic
light is almost less than 300 seconds. Accordingly, if a car
0 3 6 9 1 2 1 5 1 8 2 1 2 4
5 0
6 0
7 0
8 0
9 0
1 0 0
1 1 0
1 2 0
Tim
e C
ons
ump
tion
 (s)
T i m e
 T i m e  C o n s u m p t i o n T r a n s i t i o n  P r o b a b i l i t y
0 . 3 5 4
0 . 3 5 6
0 . 3 5 8
0 . 3 6 0
0 . 3 6 2
0 . 3 6 4
0 . 3 6 6
0 . 3 6 8
Tra
nsit
ion 
Pro
bab
ility
(a) Dataset in Shanghai
0 3 6 9 1 2 1 5 1 8 2 1 2 4
7 5
7 8
8 1
8 4
8 7
9 0
9 3
9 6
9 9
1 0 2
1 0 5
Tim
e C
ons
ump
tion
 (s)
T i m e
 T i m e  C o n s u m p t i o n    T r a n s i t i o n  P r o b a b i l i t y
0 . 3 5 0
0 . 3 5 2
0 . 3 5 4
0 . 3 5 6
0 . 3 5 8
0 . 3 6 0
0 . 3 6 2
0 . 3 6 4
Tra
nsit
ion 
Pro
bab
ility
(b) Dataset in Asturias
Fig. 9: The change of time consumption and transition prob-
ability with time growing.
stops more than 300 seconds, the start and the end records of
this stopping period are stations. We extract 178537 stations
from 50 vehicles in 100 days. We regard the number of these
stations, i.e. 178537, as the ground truth in Fig. 10. However,
our method is implemented in the TTP. The third trust proxy
just stores traces data of time and grids, and the TTP cannot
judge whether a car stops in a grid. So we extract stations by a
threshold in our method. Note that the thresholds are variable
in different grids and time intervals. We denote the average
speed of region r in time interval t as v(r, t) km/hours. When
using different thresholds, we make statistics of the numbers
of stations from 50 vehicles in 100 days. The result is depicted
in Fig. 10. So we set the threshold in this region equals 9v(r,t)
hour(s). The first and the last records in this grid are stations,
which means that a user goes into and leaves this location,
respectively. Accordingly, we extract 1850979 stations from
this dataset.
In the step of filling the path based on GP (t), we choose the
kth shortest path. The probability of k depends on the statistic
of the real data. We count the transition probability rank of
traces between stations. The relations between the rank (k)
and proportion of two datasets are both shown in Fig. 11.
The experiments are implemented in Python 2.7. The con-
figuration of the used computer includes: A CPU Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2665 at 2.4 GHz, 32 GB of RAM, 1 TB of disk
space and Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise.
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6.2 Efficacy
In this subsection, we measure how effectively our method
works by a general inference attack [12]. Specifically, given
the user’s observed traces and fundamental knowledge needed,
the state-of-the-art adversary’s attack model filters out the real
traces by inference attack. In this attack model, the attacker
uses a set of training traces to create, via the knowledge
construction mechanism, a mobility profile for each user in
the form of a Markov Chain transition probability matrix.
Having the user mobility profiles and the observed traces, the
adversary tries to infer the actual traces. They compute the
expected error of an adversary who observes a user’s trace
and then forms a probabilistic estimation of his/her location.
This probabilistic estimation is based on a Bayesian location
inference approach. The preservation efficacy of model is
defined as the probability of error to infer the real trace by
an attacker. The higher the probability is, the more effectively
the protection mechanism performs. Consider an exemplary
situation. The TTP sends a real trace of Alice and impostor
traces together to LBS provider, and the adversary Bob has
access to the LBS queries. He tries to infer the real trace from
blended data by a strong inference attack. If he finds 2 real
traces from 10 groups of blended data, the accuracy rate of
the adversary is 20%, i.e., the preservation efficacy is 80%.
In the experiment for testing the efficacy, we adopt the fine-
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Fig. 12: The Relations of Efficacy, NS , and α.
grained traces. We divide a day into 288 intervals (NU = 288),
and input 15000 seed traces to build the offline generator. For
the dataset in Shanghai and Asturias, the average lengths of
seed traces are 3.82 and 3.58 intervals, respectively. Maps used
in the experiment are the central areas of Shanghai city and
Asturias city. Both of them contain 12× 9 grids.
To choose the most proper parameters α, β, and NS
when generating regional semantic features, we investigate
the relations among efficacy, NS , and α in Fig. 12 when
synthesizing 4 impostors for each trace. According to the
result, we set the importance index α = β = 0.5 and NS = 4.
After the process of computing semantic similarity among
regions by Algorithm 1, we set the threshold in the Hierarchi-
cal Clustering algorithm to be 0.75, and cluster grids based
on the similarity graph. The relations between the threshold
of hierarchical clustering algorithm and the efficacy are shown
in Fig. 13. This gives the reason why we choose 0.75 as the
threshold. Then we input the test traces to synthesize impostor
traces by Algorithm 3.
We generate the different numbers of impostor traces (1,
4, 7, and 10 per real trace) through 4 different synthetic
generation techniques:
(1) LA-Lppm [40]: Generating dummies around the user in
a grid to achieve the restriction of movement consistency and
anonymous area. It also makes dummies cross paths with the
user to reduce the traceability of the user’s location.
(2) RDT-Lppm [9]: Generating fake locations based on
traces. It approaches the realism of actual traces by using
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Fig. 13: The relations between the efficacy and the different
thresholds of the hierarchical clustering algorithm.
probabilistic models of driving behavior abstracted from real
traces. It utilizes 3 characteristics which are derived from a
statistical analysis of actual driving traces: realistic starting
and ending points, goal-directed routes with randomness, and
spatially varying GPS noise.
(3) DAP-Lppm [41]: Anonymizing a user’s location based
on his/her movements with pauses when using LBSs with mo-
bile devices. It generates dummies that move while stopping
at several locations like a real user; the dummies also take into
consideration geographical restrictions.
(4) SG-Lppm [8]: Generating fake traces of the real trace
by the semantic features of regions. It extracts the semantic
features through matching every location of every two users. In
the process of generating fake traces, it replaces all locations
in a user’s real trace with ones in the same semantic cluster
and generates traces by the Hidden Markov Model.
After that, we input the observed traces which contain the
real and impostor traces to the attack model [12], and compute
the efficacy of different methods.
Fig. 14 depicts the efficacy of these methods. The result
shows that our method and SG-Lppm perform much better
than others in these two datasets, achieving the efficacy
surpassing 90% when inputting different numbers of observed
traces. When uploading 11 observed traces for each real trace,
our approach can achieve the preservation efficacy of 97.95%,
and 95.91% in datasets of Shanghai and Asturias, respectively,
compared with 98.33% and 97.59% by SG-Lppm. As a
matter of fact, SG-Lppm performs slightly better than ours.
The methods, LA-Lppm, RDT-Lppm, and DAP-Lppm, do not
consider the semantic features of traces and have randomness
in generating impostor traces. For the case of the state-of-
the-art protection SG-Lppm, it synthesizes traces based on the
regional semantics which are extracted from time and space
features of human mobility. They build a straightforward but
high-cost module by considering all locations in individual
traces. Compared with SG-Lppm, in our method, a population-
level model neglects the latent spatiotemporal correlations
among visited locations, then inevitably leads to the degra-
dation of extracting semantic features. Therefore, under the
premise of avoiding non-negligible efficacy degradation, we
achieve low computational complexity. The experiment results
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Fig. 14: Efficacy of Different Generation Techniques.
are shown in the next subsection.
6.3 Scalability
According to the results of efficacy evaluation, our method and
SG-Lppm perform much better than others. So, in this subsec-
tion, we compare the scalability of these top two methods in
two aspects: Memory Consumption and Time Consumption.
6.3.1 Memory Consumption
We evaluate the memory consumption of our method and SG-
Lppm. When establishing the generator of impostor traces,
we store the necessary data in memory, which contain the
semantic similarity of grids, and the users’ mobility model.
The space complexity of ours is O(|R|2+|R|·NM ), compared
with O(|R|2 + N · |R| · NU ) for SG-Lppm, where N is the
number of input traces, and |R| is the number of regions.
In the experiment, we compute the memory consumption
when using different scales of maps (12 × 9, 20 × 15, 32 ×
24, and 42 × 35 grids of area 1km × 1km). We set NU =
288, and input 15000 seed traces corresponding to different
scales of maps to build generators. Fig. 15 shows that the
memory consumption and growth rate of ours are much less
than SG-Lppm. On the map of 42× 35 grids in Shanghai city
and Asturias, the consumptions of ours are 191.73MB and
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Fig. 15: Memory Consumption of Building the Module.
TABLE 2: Runtime of generating one impostor trace.
Map Scales 108 300 768 1470
Shanghai 19.76ms 24.11ms 53.33ms 115.24ms
Asturias 17.89ms 21.71ms 51.77ms 110.32ms
178.21MB, respectively, while the consumptions of SG-Lppm
are 1508.62MB and 1459.07MB, respectively.
6.3.2 Execution Time
We compute the runtime of building the offline generator
between ours and SG-Lppm. The time complexity of ours is
O(N · L+ |R|3), compared with theirs
O(N2 · |R|3 ·NU + |R|2 ·NU 2),
where N is the number of seed traces (usually a large number),
|R| is the number of regions on the map, and L is the average
length of the traces (L ≤ NU ). It is straightforward that if we
try to build the impostors generator, it requires large amounts
of input traces. In this evaluation, we compare the execution
time of 4 scales of maps (12 × 9, 20 × 15, 32 × 24, and
42 × 35 grids), and input 5 different numbers of seed traces
for each map when NU = 288. The scales of the input data
is the number of locations of the seed traces (Num = N ·L).
The relations between the scale of data and time consumption
under different scales of maps are shown in Fig. 16. On the
map of 42×35 grids, the maximal scales Num of the datasets
in Shanghai and Asturias are about 2.1 million and 2.0 million,
respectively. The time consumptions are 230.47 seconds and
215.92 seconds, respectively. Under these conditions, we have
executed SG-Lppm for two weeks on the server but without
any output. This is the reason why we only show the execution
time of generating synthesizing model of our method in Fig.
16. In contrast to such a frustrating result, while synthesizing
10 impostors each time, a preservation efficacy of 97.68% and
96.24% can be obtained by our method under this condition
in two datasets, respectively.
Moreover, we test the time consumptions of generating
traces through the online impostors’ generators on different
scales of maps: 12 × 9, 20 × 15, 32 × 24, and 42 × 35
grids (the size of grids are 1km × 1km). We record the time
consumptions for synthesizing one impostor trace in different
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Fig. 16: Runtime of Building the Module.
scales of maps in Table. 2. SG-Lppm is really not scalable
for large-scale maps and massive seed traces. Therefore, we
have to implement SG-Lppm on the map of 12× 9 grids. The
runtime of synthesizing one impostor trace is 72.31 and 74.03
seconds in the datasets of Shanghai and Asturias, respectively,
much larger than ours 19.76ms and 17.89ms, respectively.
Recall that SG-Lppm [8] analyzes the transfer probabilities
among visited locations along traces of different users, and
forges a fake location corresponding to every visited location
when synthesizing fake traces. Such refined method brings
high preservation efficacy. However, such an individual-level
approach causes impressively high time complexity.
In real-life applications, it is usually convincing to regard a
user as a malicious one if the intervals between its adjacent
queries are smaller than some small threshold. Thus, if the
response time is smaller than such a threshold, then our
method can work for any continuous queries from normal
users. Assuming that the threshold time is s seconds, the
query rate of a normal user is then less than 1/s times per
seconds. From Table. 2, by our method, the response time
for one query in different scales of maps is less than 0.116
seconds. We believe that 0.116 seconds are sufficiently small
compared with the threshold mentioned above.
7 CONCLUSION
We design a scalable and high-quality method for location
privacy preservation based on the paradigm of synthesizing
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impostor traces. Two dedicated techniques are devised: the
population-level semantic model and process-independent syn-
thesis method. Combining these two techniques, our method
successfully achieves high preservation efficacy with low
computational complexity. Our method is proved to be capable
of applying to the problems of different sizes. We validate
the scalability of our method from aspects of both memory
consumption and execution time.
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